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ARTICLE 
Planning for Excellence:  
Insights from an International Review of 
Regulators’ Strategic Plans 
ADAM M. FINKEL* 
DANIEL E. WALTERS** 
ANGUS CORBETT***† 
What constitutes regulatory excellence? Answering this ques-
tion is an indispensable first step for any public regulatory agency 
that is measuring, striving towards, and, ultimately, achieving ex-
cellence. One useful way to answer this question would be to draw 
on the broader literature on regulatory design, enforcement, and 
management. But, perhaps a more authentic way would be to look 
at how regulators themselves define excellence. However, we actu-
ally know remarkably little about how the regulatory officials who 
are immersed in the task of regulation conceive of their own success. 
In this Article, we investigate regulators’ definitions of regula-
tory excellence by drawing on a unique source of data that provides 
an important window on regulators’ own aspirations: their strate-
gic plans. Strategic plans have been required or voluntarily 
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undertaken for the past decade or longer by regulators around the 
globe. In these plans, regulators offer mission statements, strategic 
goals, and measurable and achievable outcomes, all of which indi-
cate what regulators value and are striving to become. Occasion-
ally, they even state explicitly where they have fallen short of “best-
in-class” status and how they intend to improve. To date, a volumi-
nous literature exists examining agency practices in strategic plan-
ning, but we are aware of no study that tries to glean from the sub-
stance of a sizeable number of plans how regulators themselves 
construe regulatory excellence. The main task of this Article is un-
dertaking this effort. This Article draws on twenty plans from dif-
ferent regulators in nine countries. We found most generally that 
excellent regulators describe themselves (though not necessarily us-
ing exactly these words) as institutions that are more (1) efficient, 
(2) educative, (3) multiplicative, (4) proportional, (5) vital, (6) just, 
and (7) honest. In addition to these seven shared attribute catego-
ries, our reading of the plans also revealed five other “unusual” at-
tributes that only one or two agencies mentioned. Beyond merely 
cataloguing the attributes identified by agencies, this Article also 
discusses commonalities (and differences) between plan structures, 
emphases, and framings. We found that the plans differed widely 
in features such as the specificity of their mission statements, the 
extent to which they emphasized actions over outcomes (or vice 
versa), and the extent to which commitments were organized along 
organizational fiefdoms or cut across bureaucratic lines. 
We urge future scholarship to explore alternative methods of 
text mining, and to study strategic plans over time within agencies, 
in order to track how agencies’ notions of regulatory excellence re-
spond to changes in the regulatory context and the larger circum-
stances within which agencies operate. Looking longitudinally will 
also shed light on how agencies handle strategic goals that are ei-
ther met or that prove to be unattainable.  
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/2
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Regulators around the world exercise authority in a variety of 
domains, ranging from overseeing complex financial markets1 to 
increasing consumer product safety2 to protecting the environment 
and limiting adverse climate change.3 The challenges posed by a 
rapidly changing world economy pressure regulators to do more to 
protect consumers and the general public—often with fewer re-
sources, with speed befitting the information age, and with an eye 
on distributional equity and disenfranchised stakeholders as well 
as the regulated interests. Thus, they are continuously expected to 
do their jobs “better” or “smarter” than ever before.4 
Regulators face no shortage of suggestions for how to effectu-
ate “better” or “smarter” regulation. The “New Public Manage-
ment” movement,5 for example, has offered suggestions to cut reg-
ulatory red tape, do more with less, and reduce burdens on 
industry. Other suggestions involve responsive strategies for inter-
actions with regulated industries in enforcement6 and the leverag-
ing of nontraditional regulatory tools.7 Still others aim at making 
 
1.   See Stijn Claessens & Laura Kodres, The Regulatory Responses to the Global 
Financial Crisis: Some Uncomfortable Questions 8–9 (IMF, Working Paper 
No. 14/46, 2014), https://perma.cc/AZL4-H4DY.  
2.  See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Andrew T. Guzman, Importers as Regulators: 
Product Safety in a Globalized World, in IMPORT SAFETY: REGULATORY 
GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 193 (Cary Coglianese, Adam M. 
Finkel, & David Zaring eds., 2009). 
3.  See Francesco Busato & Norma Maccari, Canadian Oil Sand Extraction: The 
Nexus Between Economic Development and Environmental Sustainability 
17–19 (July 21, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Social Science 
Research Network), https://perma.cc/DM6K-2SEU. 
4.  See NEIL GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 1-19 (1998); Lorenzo Allio, On the Smartness of 
Smart Regulation – A Brief Comment on the Future Reform Agenda, 2 EUR. 
J. RISK REG. 19, 19 (2011); Better Regulation in Europe, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION AND DEV. (2010–2012), https://perma.cc/S7XF-GCVM. 
5.  Christopher Hood, The “New Public Management” in the 1980s: Variations 
on a Theme, 20 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC’Y 93, 93–97 (1995). 
6.  See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4 (1992); BRIDGET M. HUTTER, 
COMPLIANCE: REGULATION AND ENVIRONMENT 206–07 (1997). 
7.  See LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR 
IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 3–6 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer 
Nash eds., 2006); Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Reg-
ulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 691, 691–93 (2003).   
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/2
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the regulatory process more accessible and participatory.8 In addi-
tion, regulators are increasingly asked to apply established perfor-
mance management techniques to measure their progress in meet-
ing targeted outcomes and achieving public value.9 This multi-
faceted, global pressure to improve regulatory practice and perfor-
mance begs a critical question: What does it mean to say that a 
regulator is excellent?10 
One possible approach to answering this question would be to 
consult regulators themselves. What do they think about when 
they consider regulatory excellence? Regulators sometimes con-
sider their own excellence, or lack thereof, when subject to reactive 
pressures, as when the public, legislators, or courts call on them to 
explain specific actions they have taken, specific consequences they 
may be responsible for, or specific omissions.11 But, regulators also 
are encouraged to reflect proactively on what they will do in the 
near-term, and why. A main vehicle for doing so is strategic plan-
ning and the preparation of documents memorializing the results 
of such planning. 
 
8.  See Chris Ansell & Alison Gash, Collaborative Governance in Theory and 
Practice, 18 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 543, 543–45 (2007). See generally 
E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE at 2–6, 62–63, 69 (1988) (discussing the theory of “procedural jus-
tice”—how subjectively fair or unfair people find social processes, proce-
dures, and outcomes—and its effects on personal relationships with regula-
tory institutions). 
9.  See MARK H. MOORE, RECOGNIZING PUBLIC VALUE 3–4, 9–10 (2013); DONALD 
P. MOYNIHAN, THE DYNAMICS OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT: CONSTRUCTING 
INFORMATION AND REFORM 3 (2008); OECD, OECD FRAMEWORK FOR 
REGULATORY POLICY EVALUATION 3, 13–14, 89 (2014), https://perma.cc/XT7R-
AGD5; Poul A. Nielsen, Performance Management, Managerial Authority, 
and Public Service Performance, 24 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 431, 431–
33, 438–39 (2014); Beryl A. Radin, What Can We Expect from Performance 
Measurement Activities?, 28 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 505, 506 (2009); 
Dennis C. Smith, Making Management Count: A Case for Theory- and Evi-
dence-Based Public Management, 28 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 497, 497–
99, 501–03 (2009). 
10.  This Article is one of the final products of a multi-year project convened by 
the Alberta Energy Regulator; other reports and summaries can be found at 
https://perma.cc/R7NE-DAYM. In particular, see ACHIEVING REGULATORY 
EXCELLENCE (Cary Coglianese ed., 2016). 
11.  See generally Christopher Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, Oversight in Hind-
sight: Assessing the U.S. Regulatory System in the Wake of Calamity, in 
REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 1–
16 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012).   
7
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In recent decades, strategic planning “has become orthodox 
practice” for regulators and other public-sector organizations 
around the world.12 For instance, in the United States, the Gov-
ernment Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires federal reg-
ulatory agencies to produce, at the very least, five-year strategic 
plans with statements of their mission, general goals and objec-
tives, and means to achieve those goals.13 Of course, strategic plan-
ning does not follow a “one-size-fits-all model,”14 and, indeed, reg-
ulatory organizations worldwide are subject to a variety of political 
environments that may influence how and why they engage in 
strategic planning.15 Nevertheless, the strategic plans that they 
develop represent opportunities for identifying aspirational regu-
latory values from regulators’ own expressions of their goals. 
Strategic plans seek “to produce fundamental decisions and 
actions that shape and guide what an organization (or other entity) 
is, what it does, and why it does it.”16 They provide a “starting point 
and foundation for defining what the agency seeks to accomplish, 
identifying the strategies it will use to achieve desired results and 
then determining how well it succeeds in reaching results-oriented 
goals and achieving objectives.”17 Through strategic planning, reg-
ulators can rethink the purpose of their rulemaking, enforcement, 
outreach, monitoring, and other activities—and can try to fit them 
together into a coherent program in service of goals they may have 
latitude to set and refine. At times, regulators even explicitly 
 
12. Theodore H. Poister et al., Strategic Management Research in the Public Sec-
tor: A Review, Synthesis, and Future Directions, 40 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 
522, 541 (2010). 
13. Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 
§ 3(a), 107 Stat. 285 (1993). 
14. Nancy C. Roberts, The Synoptic Model of Strategic Planning and the GPRA: 
Lacking a Good Fit with the Political Context, 23 PUB. PRODUCTIVITY & 
MGMT. REV. 297, 298 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Graham S. Toft, Synoptic (One Best Way) Approaches of Strategic Manage-
ment, in HANDBOOK OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 1–3 (Jack Rabin et al. eds., 
2d ed. 2000).  
15. See Aimee L. Franklin, Serving the Public Interest? Federal Experiences with 
Participation in Strategic Planning, 31 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 126, 126–27 
(2001); Poister et al., supra note 12, at 525–26.  
16.  JOHN M. BRYSON, STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS 6 (3d ed. 2004).  
17.  U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (“GAO”), GAO/GGD-10.1.16, 
AGENCIES’ STRATEGIC PLANS UNDER GPRA: KEY QUESTIONS TO FACILITATE 
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW 1 (1997), https://perma.cc/VD94-LBAD.  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/2
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establish a goal in their strategic plans to achieve “sustained ex-
cellence” or become “an exemplary regulator that inspires respect, 
trust and confidence,”18 “a world-class leader,”19 “a high-perform-
ing organization,”20 or something similar. 
Others have studied strategic planning by public sector organ-
izations to understand how and when regulators engage in strate-
gic planning, how effective they are in doing so, and how the con-
tent of plans translates into measurable outcomes.21 In this 
Article, instead of asking what makes for an effective strategic 
planning process, we ask what strategic plans themselves can tell 
us about regulators’ perceptions of regulatory excellence. To our 
knowledge, this Article represents the first attempt to mine stra-
tegic plans’ content for the purpose of learning what regulators 
value, rather than to offer advice about how plans should be writ-
ten.22 As part of the Penn Program on Regulation’s multifaceted 
exploration of how to define and evaluate the qualities of a “best-
in-class” regulator,23 we focus on strategic plans as one important 
source of insights about what criteria could be used to set the “best-
in-class” regulators apart from the pack. The main objective of this 
Article is thus to illuminate how regulators themselves construe 
“regulatory excellence” in the mission statements they craft, the 
strategic goals they set, and the outcomes they commit to measur-
ing and strive to achieve. In the process, we also gleaned some 
 
18. U.K. OFFICE FOR NUCLEAR REGULATION, ONR STRATEGY 2015 to 2020 2, 5 
(2014) [hereinafter UKONR 2015-2020]. 
19.  NERSA, ANNUAL REPORT 2012/2013 2, 9 (2013), https://perma.cc/6X6Z-
XCYH. 
20.  U.S. EPA, EPA-190-R-14-006, FY 2014-2018 EPA STRATEGIC PLAN 51 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/4XPG-4WWN. 
21.  See, e.g., GAO, supra note 17, at 1; Rebecca S. Ayers, Building Goal Align-
ment in Federal Agencies’ Performance Appraisal Programs, 42 PUB. 
PERSONNEL MGMT. 495, 495–96 (2013); Franklin, supra note 15, at 126–28; 
Rebecca Hendrick, Strategic Planning Environment, Process, and Perfor-
mance in Public Agencies: A Comparative Study of Departments in Milwau-
kee, 13 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 491, 491 (2003); Poister et al., supra 
note 12, at 528–31 tbl.1; Isaiah O. Ugboro et al., Strategic Planning as an 
Effective Tool of Strategic Management in Public Sector Organizations: Evi-
dence from Public Transit Organizations, 43 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 87, 88–89 
(2011). 
22.  Rhys Andrews et al., Strategy Content and Organizational Performance: An 
Empirical Analysis, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 52, 58 (2006). 
23.  See Best in Class Regulator Initiative, PENN PROGRAM ON REGULATION, 
https://perma.cc/A9AE-A3JJ.  
9
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observations, which we offer at the end of the Article, about how 
the strategic planning process itself and the common and diverging 
features in our sample of plans contribute to understanding regu-
latory excellence, thus complementing the existing literature on 
strategic planning. 
II. DATA AND METHODS 
The primary aim of this Article is to analyze a broad range of 
strategic plans in order to elicit the themes and issues that regula-
tory organizations around the world are concerned with—all in an 
effort to glean from regulators’ own words what constitutes regu-
latory excellence. We use these raw materials to generate a list of 
attributes of regulatory excellence that stem directly from the ex-
periences of regulators engaged on the front lines, and we catalog 
statements from the strategic plans into specific attribute catego-
ries. 
To advance the goal of generating an inventory of attributes of 
regulatory excellence, we were purposive in our sampling. In total, 
we reviewed twenty strategic plans from nine countries (including 
three plans produced by state-level agencies in the United States). 
The sampled regulators came primarily from the fields of energy, 
environment, and natural resources regulation. The vast majority 
of the plans we consulted were written or available in English, alt-
hough one plan from the Mexican government was only available 
in Spanish.  For readers who wish to view or download any of these 
public-domain documents, we have compiled them in an online re-
pository.24 
A. Plan Selection and Analysis 
In selecting plans for inclusion in the study, we sought as 
broad a range of plans as possible, to offer a general account of how 
different regulators view excellence and to help ensure that unique 
perspectives on excellence were not excluded inadvertently. For 
this reason, we sought plans from a variety of countries and cul-
tures, and from regulatory organizations that sometimes ap-
proached problems with different tools and different authorities. 
Many of the plans reviewed came from “traditional” regulatory 
 
24.  See Strategic Plans Used in Paper, UNIV. OF PA. https://bit.ly/2l8Ssfa. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/2
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organizations in the sense that they came from a discrete govern-
ment agency. But others, including the United Kingdom’s Oil and 
Gas Plan, represented a plan for a multiagency collaboration with 
industry designed to comprehensively manage a concrete problem, 
in this case the safe promotion of the energy sector’s operations. 
Likewise, it could be said that a particular plan was “freestanding” 
(in the sense that it was independently produced by the regulatory 
organization), or in other cases was subordinate to a higher-level 
plan, as when a regulatory organization within a cabinet depart-
ment writes a sub-plan that frequently refers to how its goals re-
lated to the higher-level goals of the larger department. Since we 
intended our research to benefit regulatory organizations with a 
wide variety of structures and missions, diversity was our key se-
lection criterion. We developed a preliminary typology of plans (see 
Table 1) to assist the reader in understanding these more general 
differences across the regulators in our sample. 
Table 1. Strategic Plan “Flavors” 
1. Is the plan freestanding or subordinate to a plan produced by a 
higher-level agency (or a nation as a whole)? 
2. Does the plan articulate single, isolated objectives or inte-
grated, multiple objectives? (E.g., “our mission is to protect the 
environment” versus “our mission is to protect the environment 
while maintaining some level of economic growth.”) 
3. Is the plan balanced between activities and outcomes, or is it 
focused more on one or the other? (Some plans contained no 
information about how conditions will change, while others 
said nothing about what actions would lead to predicted 
changes in conditions.) 
4. Are the top-level goals arranged by organizational sub-unit 
(e.g., air, water, and land offices at an environmental author-
ity), by “cross-cutting issues,” by both types separately, or by a 
matrix approach combining both? 
5. Are internal management goals (e.g., hiring, diversity, good cit-
izenship) an integral part of the plan? 
 
11
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Once we generated our list of strategic plans to review through 
a series of Internet searches and references from others, we set 
about reading each of the plans, identifying themes and recurring 
issues, and developing a list of attributes from these recurring pat-
terns. After we inductively generated a list of attributes, we re-
turned to the plans and collected passages that fit in each of the 
general attribute categories. We also made note of important 
themes and issues that did not fit into any of the attribute catego-
ries. Section III of this Article presents the findings from our re-
view, offering examples of each of the attributes drawn from a wide 
range of plans. 
B. Relationship of Strategic Plans to Core Regulatory 
Functions 
Analysis of regulatory excellence can be considered in connec-
tion with four core regulatory functions: “priority-setting, problem-
solving, people (internal management), and the public (external 
engagement).”25 We did not expect that strategic plans would nec-
essarily treat each component of the regulatory core equally or 
even explicitly. On the contrary, because of the nature of strategic 
planning, we expected certain core functions of regulatory organi-
zations would be mentioned or discussed more often in strategic 
plans than other functions were. Table 2 breaks down our predic-
tions about the role strategic planning would play with respect to 
each component or function of the regulatory core. 
We expected, for instance, that priority-setting would be heav-
ily discussed in strategic plans in general, and we indeed observed 
that basically all plans engaged in some articulation of their agen-
cies’ most important goals, missions, or plans of action. In some 
contrast to this paradigmatic function of strategic planning, we ex-
pected that problem-solving—especially with reference to specific 
regulatory instruments or enforcement strategies—might receive 
less attention in an average strategic plan. We expected this be-
cause regulatory organizations generally engage in problem-solv-
ing in much more concrete situations than a typical strategic plan 
allows. We expected that regulatory organizations would resist “ty-
ing themselves to the mast” by announcing a commitment to 
 
25.  CARY COGLIANESE, LISTENING AND LEARNING: TOWARD A FRAMEWORK OF 
REGULATORY LEADERSHIP 9 (2015), https://perma.cc/FA9Q-PPL4. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/2
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particular principles or methods of problem-solving, and they like-
wise might resist limiting their discretion in enforcement strategy. 
 
Table 2. Relationship Between Strategic Planning and the 
“Regulatory Core” 
 
Regulatory Core 
Component 
Theoretical Role 
for Strategic 
Planning 
Potential 
Applications 
Priority Setting Major 
Articulate goals, 
missions, and plans of 
action 
Public (external 
engagement) Varying 
Identify outreach plans, 
inform the lay public of 
agency business 
People (internal 
management) Varying 
Outline needs and 
wants, make the case 
for additional support, 
and develop plans for 
human capital 
development 
Problem Solving Minimal 
Announce focus on 
particular methods and 
tools, outline 
enforcement strategies 
 
Finally, we expected that strategic plans would be somewhat 
variable in terms of their treatment of internal personnel manage-
ment and external public relations. We expected that regulatory 
organizations would emphasize these components if their external 
environment demanded it, such as if the regulator had suffered 
steep budget cuts in recent years or if public backlash had arisen 
against a regulatory program. At other times, we predicted that 
these components would receive scant mention compared to prior-
ity-setting. 
13
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III. ATTRIBUTES OF REGULATORY EXCELLENCE 
This section discusses the major attributes that we found in 
the examined strategic plans. These are attributes that the reports’ 
drafters—and presumably the overall leadership of their public or-
ganizations—held up as desirable targets of their overall commit-
ment to regulatory improvement. The seven categories of attrib-
utes presented here are not arrayed in any intentional order of 
presentation, but together they contain a total of twenty-five spe-
cific attributes that could be used to epitomize regulatory quality 
and track improvement. Specifically, as shown in Figure 1, we find 
that most of the attributes expressed in regulators’ strategic plans 
can be said to fall into the following seven categories: 
• Efficient 
• Educative 
• Multiplicative 
• Proportional 
• Vital 
• Just 
• Honest 
In labeling these categories, and the specific attributes within 
each category, we have deliberately used adjectives, rather than 
nouns, to make clear that regulatory excellence exists along a spec-
trum. Characterizing attributes as nouns might imply a binary 
condition (that is, that the regulator either does or does not exhibit 
the attribute), rather than connoting a gradation. For example, the 
question is not whether a regulator either does or does not achieve 
“proportionality” but rather how “proportional” the regulator is, 
judged by the extent to which the regulator designs its actions to 
match the needs of the decision. Cary Coglianese divides the na-
ture of regulatory performance into three categories: traits, ac-
tions, and outcomes (he calls this “the TAO of regulatory excel-
lence”).26 In our view, the first of these kinds of excellence asks 
regulatory officials to answer the question, “What virtues do we 
hope to embody?”; the second asks, “What do we commit to do?”; 
and the third asks, “What changes do we hope to see in the world 
as a result of our efforts?” Although some of the attributes might 
well appear to answer one of these questions better than the oth-
ers, we believe that each of the attributes that follow can, if cast 
appropriately, be construed as relevant to all three kinds of 
 
26.  Id. at 26–28. 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/2
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excellence. For example, consider the attribute we label “educa-
tive.” It can imply an organizational trait (“we want to be seen as 
a source of knowledge and perspective”), a specific commitment to 
action (“we commit to always publicizing every oil leak or spill we 
investigate within 24 hours of arriving on-site”), or a hoped-for—
or verified—change in the world (“we have seen an increase in the 
number of hits per month on our spill-report website and have be-
gun to see fewer spills because operators know these events will be 
publicized”). 
Figure 1: Attributes Reflected in Strategic Plans 
15
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We now proceed to explain each of the twenty-five attributes 
that we organized into seven categories. For each attribute, we pro-
vide examples from the strategic plans. 
A. Efficient 
We discovered that regulators identified efficiency as part of 
excellence by referring to at least four different attributes. First, 
some regulators referred to efficiency by invoking its role in reduc-
ing adversities on particular stakeholders. Second, some regula-
tors referred to the need for regulators to act, and make decisions, 
in a timely way. In some respects, the timeliness of actions and 
decisions of governments is of great significance to the capacity of 
stakeholders to plan their activities in a predictable and productive 
way. Third, nearly all regulators recognized the need to economize 
on the use of their own resources. This is perhaps not surprising in 
an era of increased complexity in the fields of activity that regula-
tory structures aim to influence or control. Finally, a few regula-
tors viewed efficiency in terms of making themselves easily acces-
sible to stakeholders and the public. 
 
A Note on the Many Meanings of “Efficiency” 
“Efficiency” can be defined in a variety of ways that might be 
relevant to a regulator. Sometimes it is meant to refer to what col-
loquially passes as “administrative efficiency,” such as when a reg-
ulator is deemed “efficient” because it processes applications and 
permits quickly. But, the more formal definitions of efficiency in-
volve consideration of costs and benefits, the balance between 
them, and the distributions thereof. Strictly speaking, economic 
theory reserves the term “efficient” either to describe a situation in 
which at least one person is made better off without anyone being 
made worse off (this is known as “Pareto efficiency”), or a situation 
where although one or more persons are made worse off, the total 
amount of benefits that accrue to others exceeds these costs (this 
is known as “Kaldor-Hicks efficiency”). However, regulators often 
define efficiency instead as a local optimum (that is, choosing the 
option that is better than the other available ones), a definition 
that might not entail efficiency. For example, many strategic plans 
refer to efficiency as “meeting the regulatory goal at the lowest pos-
sible cost”—which is instead the economist’s definition of cost-
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/2
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effectiveness. A cost-effective option would indeed be relatively 
more “efficient” than one that meets the goal more expensively, but 
it might not be efficient in either Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks terms. Or, 
it might be efficient but less so than some other option that was not 
considered. Finally, it is less commonly acknowledged that there is 
a mirror-image definition of “efficient” that is sometimes described 
in terms of “feasibility”—namely, not exceeding a cost constraint 
while achieving the maximum possible environmental or other 
benefit.27 In this section of the Article, we let the authors of the 
strategic plans themselves define “efficiency” in any of these ways, 
though we note the differences when the context dictates. 
1. Burden-Reducing 
Regulators’ strategic plans contained several types of aspira-
tions that can be characterized in terms of reducing burdens. One 
common way regulators sought to reduce burdens was by lowering 
the cost of compliance for regulated entities. For example, the Col-
orado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (“CoOGCC”) Mission 
Statement sought “efficient exploration and production of oil and 
gas resources in a manner consistent with the protection of public 
health, safety and welfare.”28 More specifically, the Mission State-
ment indicates that it aims to reduce unnecessary burdens on 
those developing oil and gas resources when it states that part of 
its mission is to “foster[] the responsible development of Colorado’s 
oil and gas resources.”29 Similarly, the State of Utah’s Ten-Year 
Strategic Energy Plan aimed to reduce the burden on those devel-
oping oil and gas resources by aligning “Utah’s agencies to better 
meet and facilitate responsible energy development”30 and by 
 
27.  For a general discussion of the various ways to construe “efficiency” and 
“cost-effectiveness,” see Adam M. Finkel, “Demystifying Evidence-Based Pol-
icy Analysis by Revealing Hidden Value-Laden Constraints,” 48 HASTINGS 
CTR. SPECIAL REP. (GOVERNANCE OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES: ALIGNING 
POLICY ANALYSIS WITH THE PUBLIC’S VALUES) S21, S21–22, S33 (2018).  
28.  About the COGCC, COOGCC, https://perma.cc/7ZUE-SYJP. (In the case of 
the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, references herein are 
to the Mission Statement except where specifically indicated otherwise.)  
29.  Id.  
30.  GOV. GARY R. HERBERT, ENERGY INITIATIVES & IMPERATIVES: UTAH’S 10-YEAR 
STRATEGIC ENERGY PLAN 8 (2011), https://perma.cc/C82Z-SBR9 [hereinafter 
UTSEP]. 
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creating “an effective strategy for the legitimate use of Utah’s pub-
lic lands for energy development purposes . . . .”31 
A second way of reducing burdens on stakeholders involved 
improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of the use of reg-
ulatory tools. The U.K. Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 
(“UKOFGEM”), for example, aimed to “maintain [its] simplifica-
tion agenda and work where possible within the spirit of the ‘one 
in one out’ principle to ensure that regulatory burdens on compa-
nies are no more than they need to be to protect consumers.”32 In 
a similar vein, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“U.S. 
EPA”) pledged to “streamline the Agency’s internal business prac-
tices, core program processes, and decision making. . . .”33 The U.S. 
Department of the Interior (“U.S. DOI”) said it “review[ed] pro-
gram activities for opportunities to eliminate lower priority pro-
grams, re-engineer under-achieving programs, and investigate 
new ideas to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of program 
delivery.”34 The California Energy Commission (“CalEC”) Strate-
gic Plan called on the agency to adopt standards that would be 
“flexible with straightforward compliance approaches. . . .”35 
Regulators sometimes identify facilitating coordination among 
agencies as a third means to reduce burdens on stakeholders. For 
example, the Ireland Commission for Energy (“ICER”) Regulation 
Strategic Plan stated that “[e]ffective interagency co-operation and 
working practices are necessary to ensure the regulatory function 
of each agency is discharged effectively and that the overall regu-
latory burden is minimised.”36 In a similar way, the Annual Report 
of the Australian National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Envi-
ronmental Management Authority (“AUNOPSEMA”) specified 
that the agency is to “work with government stakeholders to 
streamline regulatory processes.”37 
 
31.  Id. at 6. 
32.  UKOFGEM, CORPORATE STRATEGY AND PLAN 2011-2016 13 (2011), 
https://perma.cc/7F6C-H9JV.  
33.  U.S. EPA, supra note 20, at 52. 
34.  U.S. DOI, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2014-2018 12 (2013), 
https://perma.cc/7UYQ-RZ8X.  
35.  CALEC, STRATEGIC PLAN 3 (2014), https://perma.cc/796H-NXBB.   
36.  ICER, STRATEGIC PLAN 2014-2018 13 (2014), https://perma.cc/JL7N-XJDS. 
37.  AUNOPSEMA, ANNUAL REPORT 2013-2014 25 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/FLP2-LX29 [hereinafter AUNOPSEMA]. 
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2. Timely 
A closely related attribute concerned with efficiency is timeli-
ness in fulfilling regulatory responsibilities. Some strategic plans 
focused on, for example, maintaining the capacity to respond to cri-
ses. The U.S. Department of Energy (“U.S. DOE”) aimed to 
“[s]trengthen the effectiveness of Department of Energy incident 
management capabilities.”38 AUNOPSEMA committed itself to 
“maintain[ing] capability for appropriate regulatory crisis re-
sponse.”39 
A second category of goals relates to timeliness of decision-
making. For example, CoOGCC commits to providing “exceptional 
customer service” and states that “[w]e are responsive, fair and 
consistent.”40 Other plans, such as AUNOPSEMA’s, called for “as-
sessment decisions” and compliance activities to be carried out 
within “required timeframes.”41  The CalEC plan more generally 
stated that “[w]e are committed to providing excellent products 
and services that are timely, accurate, reliable, responsive, and 
useful.”42 A common commitment among the agencies reviewed 
was also to resolve complaints in a timely way. 
3. Economizing 
Regulators also committed themselves to guiding and influ-
encing complex markets and systems of production in ways that 
economized the workings of an entire sector, such as energy. For 
example, the National Energy Regulator of South Africa 
(“NERSA”) assumed a broad role for regulating energy “in accord-
ance with government laws and policies, standards and interna-
tional best practices in support of sustainable development.”43 This 
included a commitment to promoting a “competitive and efficient 
functioning of the energy industry . . . .”44 The U.K.’s Oil and Gas 
(“UKOG”) Business and Government Action Plan aimed to 
 
38. U.S. DOE, STRATEGIC PLAN 2014 – 2018 8 (2014), https://perma.cc/Y2C7-
VBQQ.  
39.  AUNOPSEMA, supra note 37, at 24.  
40.  COOGCC, supra note 28, at 1. 
41.  AUNOPSEMA, supra note 37, at 24.  
42.  CALEC, supra note 35, at 3. 
43.  NERSA, supra note 19, at 9. 
44.  Id. at 10. 
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“maximise the economic production of the U.K.’s offshore oil and 
gas resources.”45 Similarly, the State of California created CalEC 
to “establish and consolidate the state’s responsibility for energy 
resources, for encouraging, developing, and coordinating research 
and development into energy supply and demand problems, and 
for regulating electrical generating and related transmission         
facilities.”46 
In the context of seeking to achieve these broad goals in the 
complex fields of human activity, it is not surprising that these reg-
ulators have assumed an obligation to carry out their activities ef-
ficiently and to economize on the use of assets to achieve these 
goals. For example, NERSA committed itself to “mak[ing] the best 
use of resources to further the regulatory objectives by exercising 
objectivity and commitment to evidence-based strategies for im-
provement.”47 UKOFGEM aimed to “ensure that all the pro-
grammes with which [it is] involved are delivered through efficient 
administration and tight control of costs.”48 The U.S. DOI was 
“committed to effective financial operations and accountability in-
cluding high quality and timely reporting, robust internal controls, 
clean audits, and effective follow-up on audit and internal control 
findings.”49 In addition to many references to the need to control 
costs, there were also references to the need to prevent fraud and 
reduce waste. For example, the U.S. DOI stated that it “utilizes an 
extensive framework of internal controls to protect against fraud 
and waste and implements recommendations from the Govern-
ment Accountability Office and the Office of Inspector General.”50 
4. Accessible 
Accessibility is a fourth dimension of efficiency. Some agencies 
sought to reduce burdens on the regulated community by making 
information more accessible and by reducing the transaction costs 
associated with interactions between agencies and those regulated. 
For example, the U.S. EPA stated that it was “implementing E-
 
45. UKOG, BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT ACTION PLAN 4 (2013), 
https://perma.cc/U5AE-53MS. 
46.  CALEC, supra note 35, at 2. 
47.  NERSA, supra note 19, at 10. 
48.  UKOFGEM, supra note 32, at 15. 
49. U.S. DOI, supra note 34, at 12.   
50.  Id.  
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Enterprise, a joint EPA-state initiative to improve environmental 
performance and enhance services to the regulated community, en-
vironmental agencies and the public.”51 Other agencies adopted a 
broader goal of being accessible. For example, CoOGCC “seeks to 
serve, solicit participation from, and maintain working relation-
ships with, all those having an interest in Colorado’s oil and gas 
resources.”52 
B. Educative 
While regulatory agencies often regard rulemaking and en-
forcement as their two primary responsibilities, many agencies’ 
strategic plans included educational programs, either as the third 
leg of a tripod of responsibility or at least as an important ancillary 
function. Agency strategic plans generally refer to three distinct 
kinds of education. The first, which we call “didactic,” is somewhat 
more commonly cited than the second, which we call “evangelistic.” 
As a third kind of education, several plans emphasize that agencies 
can in effect lead by example and educate the public by “walking 
the walk.” 
1. Didactic 
Many strategic plans construe excellence as including the dis-
semination of authoritative guidance documents so that stakehold-
ers will have ready access to clear information about how to comply 
with rules, secure permits and licenses, obtain benefits, and the 
like. For example, the U.K. Health and Safety Executive 
(“UKHSE”) committed itself to reissuing printed documents and 
revising its website so that the regulated public could clearly un-
derstand which regulations imposed specific compliance obliga-
tions and which defined administrative requirements only, such as 
paperwork obligations.53 Several plans, notably that of NERSA, 
emphasized the benefits of consolidating various guidance docu-
ments pertaining to a single industry sector into a “one-stop” rule-
book.54 In addition to creating their own guidance, some regulators 
 
51.  U.S. EPA, supra note 20, at 2. 
52. COOGCC, supra note 28. 
53.  UKHSE, HSE BUSINESS PLAN 2012-15 6 (2014), https://perma.cc/UWD7-
TWM2.   
54.  NERSA, supra note 19, at 16. 
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highlighted the benefits of providing and maintaining a repository 
of information produced in the private sector. UKOG helps dissem-
inate the “Supply Chain Code of Practice” to improve the competi-
tiveness of its oil and gas companies,55 and also supports “Project 
Pathfinder,” which does not involve regulatory issues at all but ra-
ther provides a continuous update of oil and gas operations that 
suppliers and operators can use to learn of new business                  
opportunities.56 
The opportunity to provide useful information can extend be-
yond guidance documents and business opportunities; CalEC en-
deavored to generate data about trends in energy usage and dis-
seminate its findings to the general public.57 Another category of 
education involves opening up the evaluative process to the public. 
AUNOPSEMA, for instance, pledged in its plan to communicate 
lessons learned from safety incidents.58 
2. Evangelistic 
Some regulatory agencies see the opportunity to educate more 
broadly by setting goals for themselves that involve changing atti-
tudes and correcting misinformation.  Japan’s Strategic Energy 
Plan promised to engage in dialogue with nuclear operators to 
acknowledge that both sectors had fallen prey to “the safety myth” 
and failed to anticipate the events that resulted in the Fukushima 
disaster.59 At the same time, both Japan and the U.K. committed 
to pushing back against unwarranted pessimism about the indus-
tries they regulate and support, and against unfair characteriza-
tions of their own regulatory performance: UKHSE’s strategic plan 
included the creation of a “mythbusters” panel of experts to dispel 
“urban legends” about over-regulation,60 and Japan similarly 
sought to “control damage from groundless rumors” in the wake of 
Fukushima.61 UKOG took this a step further and established a 
goal of correcting the misimpression that its national oil and gas 
 
55.  UKOG, supra note 45, at 10. 
56.  Id. at 13. 
57.  CALEC, supra note 35, at 3. 
58.  See AUNOPSEMA, supra note 37, at 8. 
59. J APAN AGENCY FOR NAT. RES. & ENERGY, STRATEGIC ENERGY PLAN 4–5 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/8JP9-DMWD [hereinafter JSEG]. 
60.  UKHSE, supra note 53, at 9. 
61. JSEG, supra note 59, at 5.  
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industry was “coming to the end of its life,” a belief it said can dis-
courage talented individuals from coming to work in that industry 
and, thus, compound a skills shortage.62 Although some agencies 
see a risk in appearing to cheer for their own achievements and the 
value of the industries they regulate, others see the forthright 
chronicling of successes and responses to failures to be part of how 
an agency earns, and also merits, public trust. 
3. “Walks the Walk” 
Several agencies recognized in their strategic plans that, in 
addition to requiring and encouraging regulated entities to reduce 
externalities they may cause, they ought to commit to similar im-
provements within their own agencies, in effect treating them-
selves as exemplars. This sentiment may be motivated by a desire 
to “be the change you wish to see in the world,” or perhaps by the 
realization that an agency that does not align its own conduct to 
what it requires of those outside its walls may lose moral authority 
to do so. For example, a worker safety agency that receives nega-
tive press about injuries or illnesses in its own workforce may have 
particular difficulty imposing requirements on regulated entities. 
Mohandas Gandhi, the presumed source of the aphorism about “be-
ing the change,” explained in more detail that, “[i]f we could change 
ourselves, the tendencies in the world would also change. As a man 
changes his own nature, so does the attitude of the world change 
towards him.”63 So, “walking the walk” as an agency may engender 
better conduct among the regulated as well. 
Some of the strategic plans make general promises that the 
agency involved will meet or exceed environmental or other targets 
set for the state or nation as a whole. For example, the UKHSE 
plan committed to reducing the agency’s own greenhouse gas emis-
sions by twenty-five percent within five years.64 The Norwegian 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (“NMPE”) made a similar, 
though nonquantitative, commitment when it said that “the State 
as a builder and buildings owner should act as a driving force in 
 
62. UKOG, supra note 45, at 24–25. 
63.  13 MAHATMA GANDHI, General Knowledge About Health, in THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF MAHATMA GANDHI 239, 241 (1960), https://perma.cc/BU3K-SMH8.  
64.  UKHSE, supra note 53, at 20. Specifically, the agency set to achieve the 
emissions-reduction goal by 2015, using a baseline of emissions during 
2009–10. Id. 
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the efforts on energy diversification and the phase-out of fossil 
fuels in buildings.”65 Similarly, the U.S. DOE pledged to “minimize 
occupational illnesses and injuries to DOE federal and contractor 
employees.”66 
Other plans are more specific in tasking the agency’s rank-
and-file to act in the same responsible manner that the agency pre-
scribes for the private sector. The U.S. EPA stated that it will em-
phasize the following: 
[S]ustainable workplace choices that can be routinely practiced by 
Agency employees will continue to reduce EPA’s environmental 
footprint by increasing energy efficiency, reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions, advancing water conservation, and reducing waste, and 
will provide lessons learned to share with other federal agencies.67  
The U.S. DOI explicitly made this a collaborative endeavor, 
creating a departmental “Sustainability Council” that “links the 
efforts of employees with those of senior management to modify 
policies and practices for best results such as cooperative efforts 
(e.g., inviting employees to submit their ideas for improving sus-
tainable practices) that will foster an inclusive and transparent 
process to promote sustainability” within the Department.68 
Although most of the plans confined their pledges in this re-
gard to areas within their own purview (e.g., U.S. EPA emphasiz-
ing reducing its own carbon footprint), we note that the UKHSE 
and U.S. DOE examples above represent a worker-safety agency 
taking some responsibility for its environmental citizenship and an 
energy regulator committing to improve its own worker-safety   
record. 
C. Multiplicative 
This attribute of excellence is a central part of regulation. It is 
concerned not merely with the powers and obligations of agencies 
but also with the way agencies and governments use these powers 
to foster relationships between regulators and regulatees and 
 
65.  NMPE, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY ACTION PLAN UNDER DIRECTIVE 
2009/28/EC 6 (2012), https://perma.cc/8FZK-VRSU. 
66.  U.S. DOE, supra note 38, at 23. 
67. U.S. EPA, supra note 20, at 52. 
68.  U.S. DOI, supra note 34, at 52. 
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among all stakeholders. These relationships constitute the path-
way through which governments and agencies aim to influence the 
flow of events, leverage (hence “multiply”) scarce resources, and 
achieve public policy goals. We have identified four different path-
ways that regulators use to create the conditions for the emergence 
of relationships capable of influencing the flow of events. 
1. Strict (when Deterrence Value is High) 
In the plans that we reviewed, strict enforcement is the least 
mentioned pathway for creating relationships that act as points of 
leverage for regulators. It is important to begin with this pathway, 
though, because the capacity of agencies to threaten punishment 
is a crucial way of creating relationships that can influence the tar-
gets of regulation. The potential for punishment to be a “benign big 
gun”—that is, where the threat of punishment is always available 
but rarely used—can establish the basis for the emergence of pro-
ductive relationships between regulators and the regulated.69 
One instance in which an agency specifically identified pun-
ishment as a “big stick”70 can be found in the UKOFGEM Strategic 
Plan. The UKOFGEM is responsible for facilitating the emergence 
of markets for energy to accelerate the transition towards a low-
carbon energy sector.71 In its plan, UKOFGEM said that it would 
“also rigorously police existing licence obligations to ensure that 
consumers are treated fairly including the new 30 day notice period 
to allow consumers to respond to rising prices by switching sup-
plier.”72 ICER took a slightly different approach by promising to 
“take appropriate enforcement actions . . . to ensure compliance,” 
and specifically mentioned its power to prosecute individuals who 
work without the proper permits.73 A more specific take on this 
approach referred to the use of a targeted inspection regime to 
monitor compliance. The U.S. DOI used this approach when it 
promised to “improve production accountability, safety, and envi-
ronmental protection of oil and gas operations through increased 
 
69.  AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6, at 19.  
70.  Id. 
71.  UKOFGEM, supra note 32, at 6. 
72. Id. at 11. 
73.  ICER, supra note 36, at 11. 
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inspection of high-risk oil and gas production cases.”74 More com-
monly in our sample, regulators referred to the role of a broadly 
defined enforcement program to encourage compliance. An exem-
plar of this approach was the CoOGCC, which states that “[t]he 
Commission has a robust enforcement program to ensure operator 
compliance.”75 
2. Cooperative within Government (Solving Joint 
Problems) 
Regulatory agencies and departments of government some-
times cooperate to solve problems. Cooperation can most effectively 
enable agencies and governments to exploit synergies when the co-
operation is directed at solving discrete problems. In our sample, 
one of these problems is where an agency is charged with a function 
or obligation that requires collaboration with other agencies and 
regulatees. A second problem is where an agency is obligated to 
align the functions or roles of other agencies or departments of gov-
ernment to achieve a public policy goal. This may sometimes ex-
tend across boundaries in cases where governments have chosen to 
pursue particular policy goals in collaboration with other nations 
and international bodies. A third problem is where governments 
and agencies seek to cooperate with each other to influence regu-
latees to achieve a public policy goal. In our sample, it appears that 
cooperation emerges as an attribute of excellence when the agency 
is clear about the problem that needs to be solved and carefully 
tailors its interactions with other agencies to ensure that the pro-
cess can solve that problem. 
There were several agencies charged with a particular func-
tion that required cooperation. For example, the U.S. DOE com-
mitted to “collaborate with industry partners, state, local, and 
tribal governments, and other federal agencies—offering energy 
experts as part of the government-wide approach to incident man-
agement and response—whether the incident results from natural 
or unnatural causes, and is complex or crude, or cyber or 
 
74.  U.S. DOI, supra note 34, at 18. 
75.  Regulation & the COGCC, COOGCC, https://perma.cc/Z7ZM-X7H8 (this 
page sets out the CoOGCC’s approach to regulation). 
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physical.”76 AUNOPSEMA specifically stated that it will cooperate 
so that it is prepared for “oil spill response management.”77 
In some instances, a particular regulator has the role of bring-
ing together other agencies for the purpose of addressing a specific 
problem. For example, South Africa’s NERSA hosted the first 
South African Economic Regulators Conference to address the 
problem of how “South Africa’s economic regulators [can] contrib-
ute to cost-effective delivery of essential infrastructure in the face 
of financial, social and environmental imperatives.”78 In other in-
stances, governments announced strategic goals to align all as-
pects of government policy to achieve a specific public policy goal. 
For example, the Utah Energy Initiative set out to “align Utah’s 
agencies to better meet and facilitate responsible energy develop-
ment.”79 Agencies often seek to cooperate with other national reg-
ulatory bodies, or with international bodies, to further obligations 
stemming from international agreements. For example, the U.S. 
EPA participated in the Global Methane Initiative.80 The U.S. 
DOE committed itself to “advance the President’s vision for reduc-
ing the levels of nuclear weapons in the world, strengthen nonpro-
liferation efforts, and combat nuclear terrorism.”81 
These forms of cooperation are ambitious and complex. There 
are also instances where agencies and other government actors col-
laborate more narrowly for a specific purpose. For example, the 
UKOFGEM stated that it will cooperate “actively with the [Depart-
ment of Energy and Climate Change] in a regulatory capacity to 
ensure that the smart meters programme delivers benefits to con-
sumers and contributes fully to achieving Government goals for a 
sustainable energy sector.”82 Similarly, the CoOGCC committed it-
self to “maintain working relationships with all those having an 
interest in Colorado’s oil and gas resources.”83 
Each of these forms of cooperation is primarily concerned with 
creating better relationships between agencies and government 
 
76.  U.S. DOE, supra note 38, at 8. 
77.  AUNOPSEMA, supra note 37, at 25. 
78. NERSA, supra note 19, at 17. 
79. UTSEP, supra note 30, at 11. 
80. U.S. EPA, supra note 20, at 9. 
81. U.S. DOE, supra note 38, at 3. 
82. UKOFGEM, supra note 32, at 7. 
83.  COOGCC, supra note 28. 
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departments. It is important to note, however, that this form of 
cooperation is also designed to give governments and agencies lev-
erage with regulatees. Sometimes this leverage will help in facili-
tating economic development, and at other times it will help nudge 
regulatees to take on extra obligations. 
3. Collaborative with the Regulated 
Regulators were clear in wanting to establish meaningful re-
lationships with regulatees. In its strongest form, these relation-
ships could be described as partnerships to achieve specific goals. 
For example, the UKOG Business and Government Action offered 
a “strategy . . . jointly owned by Government and industry”84 that 
had a number of goals. The first was “to maximise the economic 
production of the U.K.’s offshore oil and gas resources . . . .”85 Sim-
ilarly, NERSA sought a “Spirit of Partnership: In working with all 
our stakeholders we deliver on our promises for the purpose of sus-
tainable development.”86 
On the whole, the relationships between regulators and regu-
latees were not often described as partnerships per se—however, 
there was a very clear goal of establishing meaningful relation-
ships. One pathway to establishing these meaningful relationships 
was by offering subsidies. Utah’s 10-Year Strategic Energy Plan 
called for a review of “the role of tax incentives for businesses to 
relocate to and expand in Utah and their potential impact on job 
creation, energy availability and the growth of energy                     
production.”87 
The CalEC strategic plan specified the importance of relation-
ships with all its stakeholders. It stated that “all interactions with 
the public and others with whom we do business are of utmost im-
portance in carrying out the Energy Commission’s responsibili-
ties.”88 It then stated that “[o]ur time, skills, abilities, intelligence, 
creativity, products, and services are focused on these important 
relationships, with an emphasis on customer service.”89 In its 
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strategic plan, the CoOGCC specified that it “seeks to serve, solicit 
participation from, and maintain working relationships with all 
those having an interest in Colorado’s oil and gas natural re-
sources.”90 The UKOFGEM’s plan aimed “to build public and in-
dustry confidence.”91 Finally, some agencies specifically recognized 
the need to establish meaningful relationships even though the in-
terests of the regulator and regulatees may diverge. For example, 
AUNOPSEMA aimed to “maintain robust, open and accountable 
relationships with industry stakeholders in relation to submission 
and assessment of regulatory plans and safety cases and broader 
regulatory functions.”92 
4. Enlisting the Citizenry 
In general, the plans reviewed gave much less attention to en-
listing public help to influence relationships with other stakehold-
ers. There were some notable exceptions, however. One important 
example was the U.S. DOE plan that “sought and incorporated 
comments from multiple stakeholders during the development of 
the Plan.”93 This is an important example because it suggests that 
the U.S. DOE’s own concept of excellence may reflect input from 
many stakeholders, including the citizenry. A second example is an 
approach adopted by the U.S. EPA which stated that it was “mobi-
lizing citizen science efforts to complement those of the EPA, 
which, combined with greater access to environmental data, en-
hanced community engagement, environmental education, new 
tools and increased analysis, will better support state and local de-
cision-making.”94 
D. Proportional 
A number of plans addressed themes related to what we call 
“proportionality,” or developing a systematic sense of when and 
how seriously to approach risks and how to match the complexity 
and cost of problem-solving tools to the size and nature of the prob-
lems encountered. Under this set of attributes, regulators 
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discussed how they would focus on the most pressing problems 
first, use modern methods of risk assessment where possible, use 
internal research and monitoring to adapt to changing conditions 
on the ground, and think about how to match regulatory tools to 
context. 
1. Worst-First-Oriented 
As expected, most of the strategic plans reviewed set specific 
goals. The U.S. EPA promised to focus its water program on small 
drinking water systems, for instance, although it did not explain 
whether that choice was based on absolute risk, risk/benefit ratio, 
or some other consideration (such as public concern).95 The 
UKHSE sought to focus attention on aging oil platforms and iden-
tify dangerous sectors of industry,96 whereas some plans went be-
yond simply listing goals or targets and, instead, articulated a risk-
based system of priority setting. The pinch of constrained resources 
led the U.S. DOI to focus on “appropriately devoting limited over-
sight resources based on robust assessments of risk.”97 Other reg-
ulators, including the U.K. Office for Nuclear Regulation 
(“UKONR”), came to the same conclusion but based their action on 
the fact that they “want[ed] everyone . . . to feel that [the agency] 
regulate[s] the nuclear industry appropriately and in proportion to 
the known hazards it presents.”98 Whether agency budgets or pub-
lic legitimacy were the scarce resources, agencies felt the need to 
get better at prioritizing. 
2. Risk- and Benefit-Considering 
Not surprisingly, given the emphasis on quantitative risk as-
sessment and cost-benefit analysis in the literature in recent dec-
ades, many agencies alluded to some form of risk assessment pro-
cess. One agency sought to “[f]oster a strong risk management 
culture” and integrate risk management into each step of the deci-
sion-making process,99 while the U.K. government more simply 
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sought to engage in its oil and gas decommissioning activities 
“safely, cost-effectively and with regard to the environment.”100 
The UKONR incorporated transparency and risk assessment by 
emphasizing its role as “a trusted source of objective information 
and advice about the risks and potential consequences of civil nu-
clear activities.”101 
Not all regulators have bought into the primacy of risk assess-
ment, however. ICER seemingly eschewed risk-based planning in 
favor of an “As Low as Reasonably Practicable” regime, with an 
“ultimate goal of zero safety incidents,” regardless of the cost.102 
Even so, ICER aimed to incorporate risk assessment into its audit-
ing and inspecting regimes. 
Indeed, while cost-effectiveness and risk assessment were 
mentioned frequently, specific commitments to quantify risks or 
engage in formal cost-benefit analysis were rare. It is perhaps the 
case that agencies are engaging in these practices but simply hes-
itate to make too many promises to achieve this level of rigor in the 
normal course of business. 
3. Research-Driven 
A number of regulators—particularly those overseeing com-
plex energy markets, managing ever-changing ecosystems, or en-
gaging in extensive inspection and enforcement activities—indi-
cated that a major goal was improving their ability to “leverage 
data and capability to improve decision making”103 and make “pub-
lic policy recommendations based on relevant and objective infor-
mation, forecasting, and analyses . . . .”104 The U.S. DOE explicitly 
emphasized its role in “identifying and promoting advances in the 
fundamental and applied sciences” and in accelerating “transfor-
mational technological advances in energy areas that industry by 
itself is not likely to undertake because of technical or financial 
risk.”105 Indeed, for some of the regulators in the sample, like the 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (“NPD”), data collection was “a 
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national responsibility” that would pay secondary dividends 
through increased value of natural resources.106 
Several agencies had plans to either develop more modern 
technologies and research programs to improve the quality of data 
on which they relied or to leverage information emerging from an-
other initiative. In the former category, the U.S. DOI planned ma-
jor initiatives to “conduct[] science to inform . . . decisions; de-
velop[] tools to analyze, visualize, translate, and extrapolate 
science; and . . . lead[] efforts to apply it at multiple scales and 
across multiple landscapes and jurisdictions to inform land and re-
source planning, policy, mitigation, and management.”107 In the 
latter category, the UKOFGEM planned to use a general rollout of 
“smart meters” to “introduce new consumer protection measures in 
response to early movers and . . . continue to explore the safe-
guards that may be necessary given the innovative market devel-
opments, tariffs and services that are likely to be stimulated” by 
the rollout.108 One plan mentioned efforts to build relationships 
with “research partners” in academia and industry in order to de-
velop technologies that would modernize the regulated industry.109 
4. Matching Regulatory Design to Context 
Only one agency explicitly focused on efforts to match regula-
tory design—e.g., the choice among market-based approaches, per-
formance standards, specific design requirements, voluntary 
standards, etc.—to the specific context under regulatory oversight. 
The UKONR’s Superseding Plan for 2015-2020 noted its intent to 
use “a wide range of regulatory tools . . . to influence positively 
those we regulate, and to encourage the achievement of sustained 
excellence in safety and security performance across the nuclear 
sector.”110 It aimed to “use a range of internal and external assur-
ance functions to ensure ONR undertakes the right amount of reg-
ulation, proportionate to the hazards and risks presented, of the 
right quality, at the right cost.”111 Given the literature on the 
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different regulatory tools available, it was somewhat surprising to 
find so few agencies explicitly aspiring to experiment and tailor 
regulatory design to the specific problems they sought to resolve. 
But as with cost-benefit analysis, this may simply reflect the agen-
cies’ resistance to making written promises, even though in prac-
tice they are availing themselves of these tools. 
E. Vital 
A major theme—indeed, one of the most consistently raised in 
the sample—was focused on the vitality of the agency, especially 
with respect to workforce vitality. It is often said that an organiza-
tion is only as good as the people who comprise it, and, judging by 
the plans’ emphasis on developing personnel capacities and provid-
ing advanced workplace technologies, this holds true for regulators 
as well. As one plan put it, the regulator’s “most valuable resource 
is its personnel.”112 We also noted that agencies sometimes—
though not as consistently—sought to improve or maintain their 
vitality as an organization by resisting complacency, challenging 
themselves to change policies nimbly, and taking structured looks 
forward and backward at their major programs (that is, to direct 
the agency as if one were driving a car, shifting focus repeatedly 
from the road ahead to the rear-view mirror). 
1. Skilled and Diverse 
Virtually every plan mentioned the importance of various fac-
ets of human capital development. According to one regulator, “[t]o 
be an exemplary organisation [the regulator] must have a stable, 
sustainable, well-resourced, competent, flexible and accountable 
team.”113 For another, “[t]he employees of [the agency] are its 
strongest asset. When employees’ health and safety are protected 
and they are well trained, empowered, and free from discrimina-
tion, they will ensure mission success efficiently and effectively.”114 
This could be accomplished by providing “a work environment that 
offers a high quality work life for all employees by engaging them 
in shaping [a]gency decisions and improving processes, and 
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providing flexible work practices, fair and inclusive employee-
friendly policies, and opportunities for continuous learning.”115 
The plans were replete with some variation on this basic theme of 
developing a hospitable environment to “attract and retain high 
caliber staff,”116 some even aiming to improve “marketing and 
branding to attract skilled talent at all levels . . . .”117 Some plans 
also emphasized opportunities for growth and rewards,118 as well 
as the importance of diversity and tolerance of “individual              
differences.”119 
Not all the plans in the sample were upbeat, however. One 
confessed that “[h]uman [c]apital management and development” 
had “been a challenge,” but at the same time remained optimistic 
that an “Integrated Human Capital Strategy” would lead to better 
results with respect to retention.120 The emphasis on retention—
and the despair where it is not occurring—is an understandable 
focus insofar as continuity in staff, and the institutional knowledge 
that comes with it, can make major differences in the regulator’s 
work. 
2. Technologically Cutting-Edge 
The work environment itself is closely related to maintaining 
a skilled and diverse workforce, and many agencies singled out the 
importance of this factor in their operations. Various plans in the 
sample emphasized “modernizing practices” to improve the “trans-
parency and timeliness” of their programs,121 thereby making for 
“flexible work environment[s], enabled by advanced information 
technologies and tools,”122 and using all of these capacities to im-
prove outcomes in programs.123 The use of technology was cited by 
some as a way to not only improve internal management but also 
to provide “analysis, products and services to the public and other 
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stakeholders.”124 Moreover, at least one agency cited the benefits 
of consistency that could come from better “internal capabilities 
and processes.”125 Despite this emphasis on technology, none of the 
plans indicated any specific intent to offer employees the benefits 
of many basic twenty-first-century solutions to workforce ineffi-
ciencies, such as smartphones or   videoconferencing. 
3. Nimble 
A number of plans articulated a need to retain some degree of 
flexibility in established programs, recognizing that “management 
is a dynamic process.”126 For instance, the UKOFGEM claimed 
that it would “[a]ssess the need for additional consumer protection 
in the light of market developments such as the Green Deal, energy 
services and tariffs, an increase in demand-side response and the 
development of heat markets.”127 Likewise, the Japanese Strategic 
Energy Plan sought to ensure nimbleness by “[e]stablishing a mul-
tilayered energy supply system which is sufficiently resilient to 
function properly not only in normal times but also in times of cri-
sis so as to ensure [a] stable supply of energy.”128 Although these 
kinds of promises to re-evaluate were common, at least one agency 
aspired to build this “nimbleness” into the very structure of its op-
erations: the UKONR’s earlier plan aimed at “changing [its] organ-
isational structure from one where we  work in separate divisions, 
to a ‘delivery-focused model,’ in which our work is grouped into pro-
grammes that reflect nuclear industry sectors,” and it anticipated 
that this plan would “provide greater flexibility, enabling resources 
to be moved quickly in response to changes in demand and             
priority.”129 
4. Evaluative (Forwards and Backwards) 
Related to changing policy nimbly, several agencies paid trib-
ute to comprehensive program evaluation as an essential tool. The 
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U.S. EPA, for instance, claimed that “[a]mong the most important 
analytical tools is program evaluation, producing rigorous evidence 
about program effectiveness as well as identifying lessons that may 
be helpful in shaping agency strategic planning in the future.”130 
One agency discussed developing their modeling capacities and 
“[u]ndertak[ing] a Significant Code Review” in which existing reg-
ulatory programs would be systematically examined.131 Others 
acknowledged that they would revisit existing approaches and 
adopt a “new direction” after tragedies such as the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear disaster,132 as well as seek to adopt a more long-
term approach in the future, investing in infrastructure and the 
like before disaster strikes.133 
While relatively few agencies singled out the importance of 
program evaluation, virtually all their strategic plans indicated 
that they engaged in some kind of program benchmarking. 
F. Just 
Some agency plans recognized that efficient policies (e.g., ones 
that maximize positive net benefits) need to be tempered by con-
cerns about equity—that is, the just distribution of benefits and 
costs. Most commonly, the focus on distribution manifests as con-
cern with the most vulnerable subpopulations. By reducing the 
“tail risk,” the agency can directly benefit those facing the greatest 
burdens, but will also, by definition, narrow the distribution of in-
equality, which may be valuable in itself. Here, we draw a parallel 
between explicit strategic goals to redress inequities in risk and 
the mirror-image goal of reducing the economic burden of regula-
tion upon the most vulnerable sectors and firms; some agencies 
emphasize one type of justice, the other, or both. 
1. Attentive to Populations Vulnerable to 
Hazards/Risks 
Several agencies emphasized a traditional notion of environ-
mental justice, promising to pay particular attention to “tribal 
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nations and insular communities”134 or to women and children.135 
Although the U.S. EPA appears to have concentrated for many 
years on minority and low-income communities, its most recent 
strategic plan decoupled concern with the demographic character-
istics of vulnerable communities and, instead, pledged to help “ur-
ban and rural” communities that are “overburdened by pollu-
tion”—in other words, focusing on the right-hand tail of the 
cumulative exposure distribution, regardless of whether the af-
fected subpopulations are disadvantaged in other ways.136 Simi-
larly, the UKOFGEM referred to “consumers that remain persis-
tently disengaged” in the energy market as a subpopulation of 
special interest, presumably without considering the other demo-
graphic attributes of these consumers. 
2. Attentive to Populations Vulnerable to Regulatory 
Costs 
In addition to the agencies that seek to preferentially inter-
vene to reduce “hot spots” of risk, at least one agency mentioned 
concern over the secondary effects of its regulatory and other in-
terventions on vulnerable populations: the UKOFGEM promised 
that, “[c]onsistent with the Government’s goal of minimising fuel 
poverty, Ofgem will seek to ensure, where we are in a position to 
do so, that the financial burden of moving towards a low carbon 
sector does not fall disproportionately on those least able to pay.”137 
A few agencies, notably the U.S. DOI and the UKOFGEM, specifi-
cally mentioned small businesses as particularly vulnerable to reg-
ulatory costs, or in special need of further assistance in competing 
for contracts and grants. No agency in our sample, however, linked 
the concerns about environmental justice and vulnerable industry 
sectors. It is possible that environmental justice policies might also 
benefit vulnerable firms or their employees—but they might in-
stead add to their economic burdens, and the plans did not mention 
how these competing concerns might be balanced or transformed 
into win-win opportunities. We also note that, while this does not 
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necessarily repudiate its concern about equity, at least one agency 
specifically pledged to be “neutral to all market players without 
favouring one or other group (non-discrimination).”138 
3. Consulting and Intervening in Two Complementary 
and Fair Ways 
We discovered that regulators routinely elaborate on their 
strategies for engaging with the public and various concerned con-
stituencies, and do so in two, somewhat complementary ways. Reg-
ulators sometimes emphasize an “even-handedness” approach that 
facilitates balanced transmission of information and representa-
tive input to and from the agency, but, at other times, express a 
need to proactively engage disadvantaged or less vocal interests 
and perspectives in the regulatory process through more targeted 
practices. 
a. Even-Handedness 
Various agencies in the sample emphasized the importance of 
maintaining appropriate balance in their transparency and access 
policies, and, ultimately, in their decision-making. 
For some agencies, this could be accomplished by simply en-
suring that information disclosure was regularized and was serv-
ing the needs of knowledge-generation leaders. For instance, 
CalEC planned to “[c]ollect targeted energy data and provide policy 
makers, consumers and other stakeholders with useful and objec-
tive information and analyses based on that data.”139 The U.S. DOI 
echoed this goal in a slightly more detailed fashion by aspiring to 
“lead the scientific research on the environment and natural haz-
ards and provide information to partners and stakeholders for use 
in making decisions that will protect lives.”140 But, regulators that 
emphasized the importance of data accessibility did not generally 
articulate the specific pathways to facilitate such access. One ex-
ception was UKOFGEM, which stated that major improvements in 
this domain could be made by “improving [its] website and call 
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handling for consumers seeking advice” and “publish[ing] research 
and other data to facilitate debate.”141 
Other agencies recognized that partnerships with the regu-
lated and various constituencies in the general public were a nec-
essary part of excellent practice, and that this task carried its own 
challenges for evenhanded inclusiveness.142 For instance, NERSA 
claimed that it would strive to “be neutral to all market players 
without favouring one or other group.”143 Other agencies were even 
more explicit about this challenge. The CoOGCC, for instance, 
claimed that it “seeks to serve, solicit participation from, and main-
tain working relationships with all those having an interest in Col-
orado’s oil and gas natural resources.”144 The State of Utah’s 10-
Year Strategic Energy Plan similarly aimed to “[e]nhance and fur-
ther integrate partnerships between industry, universities, state 
government and local communities—especially those in energy-
rich rural communities—to address future energy challenges and 
opportunities.”145 Additionally, Utah planned to “form a State En-
ergy Advisory Committee comprised of a diverse group of repre-
sentatives of energy in Utah.”146 
b. Proactive Outreach to Disadvantaged or 
Nontraditional Interests 
Many agencies in the sample noted that disparities in access 
and influence were inevitable, even with the most neutral engage-
ment and transparency policies imaginable. Therefore, they an-
nounced an intention to target specific parties or groups to help 
redress such disparities and help ensure a diversity of perspec-
tives. These targeted groups ranged from indigenous and aborigi-
nal populations to small or midsize business interests, depending 
on the regulator’s mission and responsibilities. The plans also 
ranged from general, aspirational claims about engaging these in-
terests to the more technical and practical considerations of how to 
accomplish this task. For instance, on the more aspirational and 
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inchoate end of the spectrum, the U.S. EPA’s plan sought to 
“[e]xpand the conversation on environmentalism by engaging and 
empowering stakeholders, including groups with which EPA has 
not traditionally worked, using multiple forms of outreach, collab-
oration, and information.”147 The UKOFGEM sought to “[c]ontinue 
to explore and, where possible, improve the experience of vulnera-
ble consumers engaging in the market,” and to develop “under-
standing of small businesses’ engagement with the energy mar-
ket.”148 On the more practical, concrete end of the spectrum, 
AUNOPSEMA’s corporate strategy sought to incorporate more tar-
geted stakeholder feedback on draft guidance notes and conduct 
regular “[i]ndustry information sessions and presentations” to 
reach out to less informed and engaged parties.149 Likewise, the 
UKOG’s plan reported on plans to create a “‘Business Bank’ to help 
tackle some of the deep-rooted structural barriers faced by small 
and mid-sized businesses and increase diversity in the business fi-
nance markets.”150 
The U.S. DOI’s “nation-to-nation relationship” with tribal gov-
ernments meant that the Department was particularly attentive 
to the need for “consultation and support for effective management 
of the tribal trust . . . .”151 The U.S. DOI indicated that it seeks to 
build coalitions and show “respect for the viewpoints of the 566 In-
dian tribes and the importance of maintaining strong tribal com-
munities.”152 To this end, the Department viewed consultations as 
a “key component” and also used contractual relationships with 
tribes to administer regulatory programs in a more self-deter-
mined and responsive manner.153 
G. Honest 
We have identified three different aspects to how agencies 
pledge in their strategic plans to live up to the ideals of honesty 
and candor. 
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1. Forthright 
Various strategic plans construed honesty as beginning with 
clear information, provided through unambiguous language that 
does not hide data sources or conclusions. For example, the U.S. 
EPA promised to “emphasize transparency and clarity in its com-
munications, including environmental education outreach.”154 
Similarly, the government of Japan said that, in making funda-
mental choices about the national energy mix, it would “disclose[] 
relevant information and ensure[] thorough transparency.”155 
2. Independent (Avoiding Conflict of Interest and 
Regulatory Capture) 
NERSA’s strategic plan opined that “the independence of the 
Energy Regulator from the regulated companies is a prerequisite 
for any sound regulatory system . . . [and] is also desirable to en-
sure long-term stability of regulatory practices. Avoidance of regu-
latory capture by some customer groups is also necessary for suc-
cessful regulation.”156 The U.S. DOI did not specifically mention 
capture, but it did pledge “not [to] tolerate lapses that detract and 
distract from good, honest service to the American people.”157 
3. Explanatory 
At least two agencies, both from the U.K., made specific refer-
ence to one form of honesty: letting the public in on the thought 
process that led to particular decisions.158 
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The UKOFGEM noted that “[a]ll parties, including investors, 
will benefit from increased certainty and clarity about how we will 
make regulatory decisions,”159 while the UKONR’s plan stated 
that “we continue to be committed to disclosing as much infor-
mation as possible about our activities, and how and why we have 
reached regulatory decisions.”160 In other words, regulatory hon-
esty does not consist merely in telling “nothing but the truth” but 
also in telling “the whole truth,” especially when it pertains to the 
reasons why an agency might have disappointed a particular group 
of stakeholders. 
IV. ADDITIONAL ATTRIBUTES THAT MAY REFLECT 
“UNUSUAL EXCELLENCE” 
The seven categories discussed in the preceding part comprise 
those attributes that appeared at least three or four times in our 
sample of twenty plans, and often far more frequently than that. 
For example, the attribute in Category C, “Cooperates with other 
government agencies to solve joint problems,” was mentioned in 
fifteen of the twenty plans we reviewed. But perhaps equally or 
even more valuable, for the purposes of a regulatory agency wish-
ing to consider the best features of other agencies, might be those 
attributes of excellence that are rarely mentioned in plans—per-
haps because they represent the “leading edge” of desiderata. We 
have identified five such attributes, each of which occurred only 
once or twice in the sample of plans and tended to fall outside the 
seven broad categories presented above. 
A. Engages the Next Generation in Regulatory Policy 
Many agency strategic plans mentioned the educational role 
of the regulator (see Category B above), but one plan specifically 
pledged to create “[i]nitiatives [that] will promote the engagement 
of young people as active stewards of the environment.”161 One 
might interpret this emphasis as part of “succession planning”—
helping to ensure that agencies like the U.S. DOI can count on a 
supply of future talent—but a focus on K-12 education may, 
 
159. UKOFGEM, supra note 32, at 9. 
160. UKONR 2015-2020, supra note 18, at 3. 
161. U.S. DOI, supra note 34, at 18. 
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instead, reflect a goal of influencing public preferences and expec-
tations over time so that the regulator’s mission can be carried on 
long after the current leadership has retired. 
B. Empowers Consumers/Businesses to Make 
Smarter Choices 
In regulatory agencies around the world, the reliance on com-
mand-and-control regulation is gradually being supplemented 
with programs that encourage or require more information to be 
put in the hands of consumers, who can then make choices in the 
market to further social benefits.162 In addition to various agency 
strategic plans that construe the provision of such information as 
an attribute of excellence, one agency—the UKOFGEM—has 
stated that part of its mission is to support and encourage those 
consumers who seek out and use new information. The UKOFGEM 
claimed that it is “taking steps to improve regulatory safeguards 
for consumers who have [electricity] meters with smart technol-
ogy,” presumably involving assurance of data privacy, and ensur-
ing that consumers who prepay their bills using smart meters (or 
who sell power back to the grid) are not at risk of overpayments.163 
C. Safeguards Information, Especially CBI and 
Personal Identifiers 
One plan briefly mentioned the importance of “ensur[ing] data 
is managed responsibly and is secure.”164 The paucity of infor-
mation sensitivity in the other plans was somewhat surprising, 
given that energy regulators often deal with industries with trade 
secrets and other confidential business information. Perhaps it 
was the case that it was such an obviously important aspect of reg-
ulation that only CalEC decided to mention it, when all, in fact, 
take the responsibility seriously. 
 
162. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Evan Mendelson, Meta-Regulation and Self-
Regulation, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON REGULATION 146–67 (Robert Baldwin, 
Martin Cave & Martin Lodge eds., 2010). 
163. UKOFGEM, supra note 32, at 6. 
164. CALEC, supra note 35, at 3. 
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D. Creates a Culture of Safety 
One of the more unusual findings that emerged from the study 
was the UKOG’s discussion of the steps it was taking to develop 
and institute a culture of safety. It is worth quoting at length: 
Effective asset integrity, life extension management and safety 
system implementation are seen as a strength in the UK. This 
strength is not an isolated example of good practice, but sympto-
matic of a health and safety regime and culture that are recognised 
as world-leading and which are supported by a legal framework 
that drives continuous improvement. 
   Step Change in Safety, the industry’s flagship safety initiative, 
was set up in 1997 with the aim of making the UK the safest place 
to work in the worldwide oil and gas industry . . . . The Step 
Change Leadership team includes representatives from industry, 
trade unions, workforce and the Regulators. Current workstreams 
include the development of a practical guide for workforce engage-
ment, the raising of awareness and understanding of how human 
factors and behaviours from boardroom to worksite can cause acci-
dents; helicopter safety; and asset integrity.165 
While other plans were undoubtedly concerned with safety, 
this discussion of safety culture per se represented one institution’s 
high awareness of the importance of fostering norms, attitudes, 
and practices that reinforce larger goals. We see this discussion as 
a forward-looking goal that other agencies might emulate. 
E. Adheres to Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance 
One regulator in our sample specifically referred to “corporate 
governance” practices. The chair of NERSA stated that “I also be-
lieve that we undertook our statutory duties with distinction. Our 
Corporate Governance has improved, with regular board reports 
provided on the work of the board committees.”166 As with nearly 
all regulators, NERSA also indicated a strong commitment to de-
veloping risk management plans and strategies.167 
 
165. UKOG, supra note 45, at 9. 
166. NERSA, supra note 19, at 16. 
167. See id. at 146. 
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V. DISCUSSION 
Up to this point, we have elaborated a catalog of attributes of 
regulatory excellence we found reflected in our sample of plans. We 
have drawn on the agencies’ own words to demonstrate the rich-
ness of conceptions of regulatory excellence within the seven gen-
eralized categories. In this section, we attempt to aggregate the 
data one step beyond the catalog of attributes discussed in the pre-
vious section and offer observations about commonalities (and dif-
ferences) among plan structures, emphases, and framings. Under-
standing more about the characteristics of the plans themselves 
not only provides a better descriptive understanding of the unit of 
analysis—individual written strategic plans—but also can help the 
reader interpret and consolidate the findings discussed in the pre-
vious parts of this Article. 
A. Mission Statements 
We found a considerable amount of variation in the ways that 
agencies defined their missions. Indeed, the range of approaches 
agencies used to define their missions is suggestive of the complex 
nature of regulation. One way of expressing the mission was with 
reference to an agency’s goals. For example, the U.S. EPA stated 
that its mission was “to protect human health and the environ-
ment.”168 Agencies that defined their mission in this straightfor-
ward way tended to identify in their strategic plans the attributes 
that they need to fulfill their missions. By contrast, some agencies 
used their mission statements to give an indication of both the 
goals that they will pursue and the attributes that they need in 
order to pursue these goals. The AUNOPSEMA, for example, re-
ferred to a number of attributes when it stated that it will achieve 
its goals “independently and professionally.”169 A variation of this 
approach was to describe the standards and laws that the agency 
would consider using to achieve its goals. For example, NERSA 
stated that its mission was “to regulate the energy industry in ac-
cordance with government laws and policies, standards and inter-
national best practices in support of sustainable development.”170 
 
168. U.S. EPA, supra note 20, at 4. 
169. AUNOPSEMA, supra note 37, at 16. 
170. NERSA, supra note 19, at 9. 
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Finally, some agencies defined their missions in broad and open-
ended ways. For example, the National Energy Board of Canada 
defined its mission as one of regulating in “the Canadian public 
interest.”171 
B. Actions versus Outcomes 
Although verbiage in all the plans described the virtues and 
values each agency hoped to embody, the plans varied substan-
tially in terms of how much they emphasized outcomes as opposed 
to actions. For instance, AUNOPSEMA’s plan was organized 
around functions, strategies, and performance indicators, with the 
latter category providing measurable indicators of success that 
could indicate how well each function was being handled.172 In con-
trast, UKOFGEM’s plan emphasized what it called “deliverables” 
as performance indicators, but in practice, these were usually not 
measurable variables but simply promises to act on various pro-
grams or duties.173 For instance, UKOFGEM announced plans to 
“publish [a] climate change adaptation report,” “[c]onsult on re-
vised Enforcement Guidelines,” and “[m]ake decisions on next 
steps in relation to the Retail Market Review,” among other 
things.174 
In our view, the best plans seemed to be ones that thoughtfully 
vacillated between actions and outcomes. These plans emphasized 
changes in the world that the agency will monitor and specific ac-
tions that it will take with the intent of effecting positive, measur-
able changes in those benchmarks, but also explaining how the 
agency will “connect the dots” between activities and outcomes to 
allocate resources towards those actions that are objectively suc-
ceeding. The U.S. EPA’s plan may be the exemplar here, as it em-
phasized “next generation compliance measures”175—essentially 
activity measures but whose strong and direct connection with pos-
itive outcomes had been empirically validated. For example, the 
U.S. EPA proposed to enumerate the “number of enforcement 
 
171. CAN. NAT’L ENERGY BD., 2016-17 REPORT ON PLANS AND PRIORITIES 4 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/6AC7-2HPZ. We did not evaluate this plan in full, unlike 
the 20 others discussed in this Article. 
172. See AUNOPSEMA, supra note 37, at 24–25. 
173. UKOFGEM, supra note 32, at 18. 
174. Id. at 18–19. 
175. U.S. EPA, supra note 20, at 57 tbl.1. 
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settlements that resulted from or that incorporate advanced mon-
itoring technologies.”176 Whereas a traditional activity measure 
would emphasize the number of settlement agreements per se (an 
agency function that presumably has some degree of correlation 
with improvements in air, water, and other environmental-quality 
indicators), this “next generation” hybrid measure focused on those 
settlements that would have built-in assurances that the improve-
ments will likely be realized. 
C. Single versus Multiple Objectives 
Plans fell at a variety of points on a continuum between those 
that aimed to achieve goals specified in terms of single objectives 
versus those that aimed to achieve, in an integrated fashion, more 
than one objective—or to pursue a goal subject to a constraint, such 
as to avoid imposing unreasonable regulatory costs. For example, 
the U.S. DOI plan stood toward the single, isolated objective end of 
the continuum. It was organized around six discrete objectives, in-
cluding “celebrating and enhancing America’s great outdoors” and 
“powering our future and responsible use of the nation’s resources,” 
but made virtually no mention of the costs of programs or other 
considerations that might mitigate the pursuit of these objec-
tives.177 By contrast, an example of a multi-objective plan was 
UKOFGEM’s, which stated that the regulator was “committed to 
the principles of better regulation and . . . [is] continually seeking 
to improve . . . efficiency and effectiveness,” including “reduc[ing] 
regulatory burdens while ensuring proper consumer protection” 
and administering “environmental programmes in a flexible and 
responsive manner.”178 Similarly, ICER’s stated aim was “to strike 
a balance between all the goals to ensure the public interest is pro-
tected overall.”179 
D. Cross-cutting versus Stove-piping 
Some plans were written in “stove-piped” fashion according to 
specific programs, while others were written to highlight that core 
missions and goals cut across programs and applied to each. For 
 
176. Id. 
177. U.S. DOI, supra note 34, at 26, 36. 
178. UKOFGEM, supra note 32, at 25. 
179. ICER, supra note 36, at 2. 
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example, the U.S. EPA’s plan typified a stove-piped plan, as it ar-
ticulated separate goals for each of its program offices (e.g., air 
quality, water, toxic chemicals, etc.).180 Many other plans avoided 
this structure, opting instead to fashion the plan around goals and 
missions that applied to a variety of programs and tasks. For in-
stance, the U.S. DOI structured its plans across four mission ar-
eas—“celebrating and enhancing America’s great outdoors,” 
“strengthening tribal nations and insular communities,” “powering 
our future and responsible use of the nation’s resources,” and “en-
gaging the next generation”181 —within which were specific goals 
that applied to but also cut across the department’s numerous bu-
reaus. In noting the difference, we do not opine on the better way 
to write a plan, as this very much depends on an agency’s struc-
ture, history, and situation, but we did wonder if cross-cutting 
plans might be less subject to tunnel vision or myopia because they 
may force agency leaders to look at excellence through a broader 
lens. 
E. Frequency of Categories and Attributes 
The plans we reviewed did display some variation in the con-
sistency of treatment across the attributes. Although we caution 
readers to not read too much into the frequency of any one attrib-
ute in the plans, since our sample was neither random nor neces-
sarily representative of all regulatory strategic plans, Table 3 pro-
vides a numerical breakdown of how often each category and 
subattribute was mentioned across our sample of plans. For in-
stance, we found that the plans most frequently discussed issues 
related to economizing, cooperating with other units of govern-
ment, and partnering with regulated industry. On the other hand, 
we observed that the plans relatively infrequently mentioned ways 
to enhance or maintain convenient access to stakeholders, methods 
to match regulatory design to the needs of particular situations, or 
initiatives to focus on vulnerable subpopulations. 
 
 
Table 3. Frequency of Attributes of Excellence 
 
180. See U.S. EPA, supra note 20. 
181. U.S. DOI, supra note 34, at 23. 
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Attribute 
Category 
Number of 
Attributes 
Frequency of 
Discussion 
Percent of Plans  
Discussing 
Efficient 4 36 90% (18 of 20) 
Educative 3 15 60% (12 of 20) 
Multiplicative 4 37 85% (17 of 20) 
Proportional 4 21 75% (15 of 20) 
Vital 4 32 80% (16 of 20) 
Just 3 21 55% (11 of 20) 
Honest 3 14 40% (8 of 20) 
Note: “Frequency of discussion” enumerates the number of instances across 
the twenty plans where any attribute within each category was mentioned. 
The number of attributes was either three or four (see the second column), 
and the numbers in the frequency column are not corrected for this varia-
tion. The “percent of plans discussing” column enumerates the number of 
plans that mentioned any attribute within each category at least once. 
F. “Missing” Attributes 
We note that it is possible that a particular attribute, or even 
an entire category, may have been “missing” from a given regula-
tor’s plan—but this may not have been because the regulator over-
looked or disavowed it. It seems plausible that a particular attrib-
ute may be “missing” because some regulators have thought so 
much about it that it “went without saying.” Strategic plans tend 
to be roadmaps for where agencies want to head, rather than reci-
tations of where they have already been. (Of course, we did some-
times find examples of attributes that were briefly mentioned in 
the context of “maintaining our success in X.”) If an attribute was 
not mentioned explicitly, it may have simply reflected an editorial 
decision rather than a tacit expression of satisfaction. However, it 
is also possible that omission of an attribute may reflect a decision 
not to call undue attention to less praiseworthy facets of a regula-
tor’s current performance. The clear implication is that readers 
should not generally infer much from what is not stated within the 
plans. 
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G. Stakeholder Participation 
Few agencies used the strategic planning process itself to in-
crease the educative and multiplicative attributes of fulfilling their 
missions. But some agencies did use the process of preparing their 
strategic plans to educate stakeholders about their mission and to 
gain cooperation with those stakeholders by forming partnerships 
with them. For example, the U.S. DOE stated that during the de-
velopment of the strategic plan it consulted “multiple stakehold-
ers,”182 including members of Congress, the public, and many 
groups within the Department. The U.S. DOE explicitly recognized 
the importance of the educative and multiplicative attributes when 
it stated that “[t]hese comments addressing alternative concepts, 
priorities, metrics, risks and uncertainties were considered as stra-
tegic goals and objectives were developed.”183 
H. Strategic Environment 
Every major goal in the U.S. EPA’s plan contained a detailed 
discussion of “external factors and emerging issues” that might af-
fect the achievement of the goal.184 These narratives mentioned 
technological and market trends, pending legislation, and other 
factors that might affect the agency’s ability to deliver on its ambi-
tions. While this practice is fully compatible with the common 
“SWOT” (Strengths/Weaknesses/Opportunities/Threats) tool used 
in private-sector strategic planning since at least the 1960s,185 we 
encourage other researchers to gauge via a more powerful statisti-
cal analysis of agency strategic plans186 the extent to which 
threat/opportunity analysis is explicit or implicit in the thinking of 
other regulatory agency planners. It is certainly plausible that part 
of what makes an agency an excellent educator187 is its ability to 
separate factors it seeks to control from those outside its control. 
 
182. U.S. DOE, supra note 38, at 2. 
183. Id.  
184. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, supra note 20, at 34–35 (discussing chemical safety). 
185. See Marilyn M. Helms & Judy Nixon, Exploring SWOT Analysis—Where Are 
We Now? A Review of Academic Research from the Last Decade, 3 J. 
STRATEGY & MGMT., 215, 216 (2010); RONALD QUINCY ET AL., RUTGERS SCH. 
OF SOC. WORK & BEIJING NORMAL UNIV., SWOT ANALYSIS: RAISING CAPACITY 
OF YOUR ORGANIZATION (2012), https://perma.cc/QD8T-EY47. 
186. See infra Section VI. 
187. See discussion supra Section III.B. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article takes an important first step toward a much 
broader examination of both what regulators see as embodying ex-
cellence and how strategic planning processes can be used to im-
prove regulatory function. The bulk of the analysis here has fo-
cused on distilling concepts of regulatory excellence from the 
content of a diverse sample of strategic plans. Our analysis re-
vealed seven categories of attributes containing a total of twenty-
five attributes within those seven categories, all of which agencies 
repeatedly invoked when called on to articulate their vision for 
their organization. The analysis also revealed less common, but no-
tably innovative, ideas about what it means to be excellent in reg-
ulation. We also observed patterns in how plans were developed 
and framed, with potential implications for a growing literature 
providing guidance on how to construct and deploy these plans.188 
Our analysis of strategic plans provides a unique window into how 
agencies conceive of excellence and use strategic planning to ex-
press those conceptions. Of course, we hope this analysis will en-
courage others to undertake much larger explorations of attributes 
of regulatory excellence and of strategic planning processes. In this 
section, we briefly outline potential avenues for future research 
along these lines. 
First, a productive step would be to conduct a more systematic 
and quantitative analysis of the attributes in regulators’ strategic 
plans. Content-coding text analysis software could greatly enhance 
the depth of our analysis, and by using a suitable algorithm to 
search for certain patterns, researchers could analyze a greater 
number of plans. In the future, scholars could also develop a 
broader and more representative sample in order to permit statis-
tical inferences about plans’ coverage of attributes of regulatory 
excellence (and of the quality of the strategic planning documents 
themselves). As our aim was explicitly exploratory, we did not in-
tend our analysis to definitively support conclusions, for example, 
about the relative importance of various attributes. Of course, even 
a representative sample would not allow any kind of ranking of the 
importance of all possible attributes, since many attributes are 
 
188. See Poister et al., supra note 12; STEVEN COHEN, SHELDON KAMIENIECKI, & 
MATTHEW A. CAHN, STRATEGIC PLANNING IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: A 
POLICY APPROACH THAT WORKS (2005). 
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simply so fundamental that they go without saying in strategic 
plans (and, indeed, they may not be covered here for that reason). 
But a representative sample would perhaps provide a better sense 
of how universally valued certain less-commonly-cited attributes 
may be. 
Second, any review of strategic plans only whets the appetite 
for more information about how regulatory organizations use stra-
tegic planning processes, and to what effect. In order to know more 
about these kinds of questions, it would be particularly useful to 
know more about how regulators alter their strategic plans in re-
sponse to changing circumstances. In future work, scholars could 
examine what ideas persist and which drop out of strategic plans, 
and under what circumstances and conditions. Do regulatory or-
ganizations simply delete and abandon goals that are not working 
out in practice, hoping no one will notice? Do they alter the target 
during the pendency of a plan, with or without calling attention to 
the need to lower (or raise) expectations? Or do they reflexively 
place the same ideas in their strategic plans year in and year out 
without regard to demonstrated success or failure? These kinds of 
questions are important to answer in order to understand just how 
sincerely strategic plans ought to be taken as statements of aspi-
rations toward regulatory excellence. Of course, answering them 
would require a systematic longitudinal study of repeat plans by 
the same regulators. Such a study would build on the foundation 
we have established with this Article and would not only advance 
our understanding of what defines regulatory excellence but also 
move closer to understanding the extent to which regulators actu-
ally achieve excellence in practice. 
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